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Commentary
BRAGDON v. ABBOTT, ASYMPTOMATIC GENETIC
CONDITIONS, AND ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW:
A CONSERVATIVE PERSPECTIVE
ROGER CLEGG, J.D.*
INTRODUCTION
The first question addressed in this issue of the Journal of Health
Care Law & Policy is whether the Americans with Disabilities Act,1 as it
was interpreted by the United States Supreme Court in Bragdon v. Ab-
bott,2 makes it illegal to discriminate against people with asymptomatic
genetic conditions. Inevitably, however, there is also discussion of
whether such discrimination should be illegal, if it is not.
But conservative lawyers like myself will insist that these two is-
sues-the former about what the text of the statute means, the latter
about what sound policy requires-are distinct. It may make no sense
at all for Congress to have written a statute that bans a certain kind of
discrimination, but if it did, we must follow it. Conversely, we may all
devoutly wish that a certain kind of discrimination be barred, but
courts and bureaucrats should not twist a statute to reach this result if
that is not its plain meaning.
Accordingly, this Commentary is divided into four parts. The
first two are legal, discussing the text of the ADA and its interpretation
in Bragdon v. Abbott.3 The next two parts, which are much longer, fo-
cus on policy. The policy discussion begins with the specific issue of
asymptomatic genetic conditions.4 But the bulk of the paper returns
to first principles and asks when discrimination should be illegal.5
* Vice President and general counsel of the Center for Equal Opportunity, a non-
profit, Washington, D.C.-based research and educational organization. BA., Rice Univer-
sity, 1977; J.D., Yale Law School, 1981. Mr. Clegg served as a deputy in the Justice
Department's Civil Rights Division from 1987 to 1991. He prepared this paper while also
an adjunct professor at George Mason University School of Law, where he taught a course
in employment discrimination law.
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994).
2. 118 S. Ct. 2196 (1998).
3. See infra text accompanying notes 6-20.
4. See infra text accompanying notes 21-42.
5. See infra text accompanying notes 43-82.
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I. THE PLAIN MEANING OF THE ADA
The ADA defines "disability" as: "(A) a physical or mental impair-
ment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of
[an] individual; (B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) being
regarded as having such an impairment."6 The obvious objection to
applying this provision to a genetic predisposition for an affliction is
that the statute clearly is written to cover present and past impair-
ments but not future ones.
Consequently, one must argue that a genetic predisposition is it-
self a "physical impairment" under subsection (A). But this is not a
plausible reading of the statute's text. The physical impairment does
not exist until the affliction actually develops.
Moreover, even if we decide that a genetic predisposition is itself
a physical impairment, one must further point to some "major life
activity" that it already "substantially limits." Suppose one is thirty
years old but is likely to die at age forty-five. That does not limit what
one can physically do now. And so one must claim that one's relatively
imminent death makes some choices less attractive than they would be
for someone with a likely longer life. For example, taking a particular
job or getting married or having children is more problematic; these
major life activities are thus substantially limited by a physical impair-
ment. Again, I think this stretches the statute beyond its breaking
point. Indeed, if the possibility of future impairments is a significant
limitation on major life activities, then we are all disabled. As dis-
cussed later, in a sense we all are, but that is not a plausible meaning
for the statute.
Several of the papers-Kaplan;7 Liu;' Gostin & Webber;9 Roth-
stein;' 0 and Long"-discuss the possibility that subsection (C), "be-
ing regarded as having such an impairment," 2 might provide
6. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (1994).
7. See Deborah Kaplan, The Definition of Disability: Perspective of the Disabled Community, 3
J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL'Y 358 (2000).
8. See Eugenia Liu, Bragdon v. Abbott: Extending the Americans with Disabilities Act to
Asymptomatic Individuals, 3 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL' 399 (2000).
9. See Lawrence 0. Gostin & David W. Webber, Discrimination Based on HIV/AIDS and
Other Health Conditions: "Disability" As Defined Under Federal and State Law, 3 J. HEALTH CARE
L. & POL'Y 266 (2000).
10. See Laura F. Rothstein, Genetic Discrimination: Why Bragdon Does Not Ensure Protection,
3J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL'Y 346 (2000).
11. See Clarisa Long, The Americans with Disabilities Act and Bragdon v. Abbott, (unpub-
lished manuscript, on file with J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL'Y).
12. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (C) (1994).
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coverage for those with genetic predispositions.1 3 But "such an im-
pairment" incorporates the same present or past tense requirement
that (A) and (B) do. The employer does not consider the applicant to
have an impairment now; he believes only that the applicant will de-
velop one in the future.
II. THE SUPREME COURT'S DECISION IN BRAGDON V. ABBOTT
I believe Professor Rothstein's 4 narrow reading of Bragdon v. Ab-
bott is correct. I understand that she is not necessarily endorsing this
reading, but I will endorse it.
In holding HIV-positivity to be a "physical impairment" under the
ADA, the Court thoroughly described the course of the disease and
concluded: "In light of the immediacy with which the virus begins to
damage the infected person's white blood cells and the severity of the
disease, we hold it is an impairment from the moment of infection."5
This immediate damage to the body distinguishes it from genetic
predispositions.
In his dissent, Chief Justice Rehnquist was even more explicit:
"The ADA's definition of disability is met only if the alleged impair-
ment substantially 'limits' (present tense) a major life activity."1 6 And,
of course, he goes on to reject the contrary argument precisely be-
cause "taken to its logical extreme, [it] would render every individual
with a genetic marker for some debilitating disease 'disabled' here
and now because of some possible future effects."1 7 Even the federal
regulations and interpretive guidance agree that this cannot be
right.'" Thus, it is unlikely that the courts will find that genetic mark-
ers constitute a physical impairment until something gets physically
impaired. That is only reasonable.
Bragdon v. Abbott creates other problems for future plaintiffs too.
I think that Professor Rothstein is also correct that the Court's opin-
ion may well be read as not finding reproduction to be a "major life
activity" for everyone; that under the opinion many genetic conditions
13. In Sutton v. United Air Lines Inc., 119 S. Ct. 2139, 2149-52 (1999), and Murphy v.
United Parcel Serv., Inc., 119 S. Ct. 2133, 2137-39 (1999), the Supreme Court recently dis-
cussed the "regarded as" language in the ADA.
14. See Rothstein, supra note 10, at 331. Rothstein states that the "belief that Bragdon
resolves the issue of genetic discrimination is not well founded .... " Id; cf Liu, supra note
8, at 392 (discussing how genetic predispositions could eventually be covered under Brag
don); Long supra note 11.
15. Bragdon v. Abbott, 118 S. Ct. 2196, 2204 (1998).
16. Id. at 2216 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
17. Id.
18. See generally Rothstein, supra note 10.
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will not be held to affect reproduction at all since neither the partner
nor a child is affected; and that many genetic conditions will not be
considered "substantially limiting."1 9 Once again, I will go further:
the opinion not only may be read that way-it should.
Professor Rothstein concludes her paper by stating, "The need
for protection against discrimination based on genotype seems obvi-
ous .... "20 But why is it so obvious that such discrimination should be
banned? Let's turn to this policy issue.
III. WHAT Is GOOD POLICY?
Suppose we know that individual X is going to develop an afflic-
tion that may make him a less desirable employee for Megacorp. The
issue is not whether Megacorp should hire him. The issue is when the
federal government should require all the Megacorps out there to
hire all the Xs. The fatal conceit of the ADA is its presumption that it
is possible to write a one-size-fits-all rule that bureaucrats and judges
can apply to all individuals, with all afflictions, working for all
companies. 1
During the statute's passage, U.S. Representative Henry Waxman
(D-Cal.) warned that employment decisions under the ADA "may not
be based on speculation and predictions regarding the person's ability
to be qualified for the job in the future."22 Likewise, another Repre-
sentative warned, "Under the ADA, such [genetically tested] individu-
als may not be discriminated against simply because they may not be
qualified for a job sometime in the future."23 But companies fre-
quently base employment decisions on how an employee will perform
in the future and speculate about how long an employee will stay and
whether he or she has potential to grow in the job. What's wrong with
that?
19. See Rothstein, supra note 10, at 345.
20. Id at 351.
21. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b) (1999):
It is the purpose of the Act-
(1) to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination
of discrimination against individuals with disabilities;
(2) to provide clear, strong, consistent, enforceable standards addressing dis-
crimination against individuals with disabilities;
(3) to ensure that the Federal Government plays a central role in enforcing the
standards established in this Act on behalf of individuals with disabilities; and
(4) to invoke the sweep of congressional authority, including the power to en-
force the fourteenth amendment and to regulate commerce, in order to address
the major areas of discrimination faced day-to-day by people with disabilities.
Id.
22. 136 CONG. REc. H4627 (daily ed. July 12, 1990) (statement of Rep. Waxman).
23. 136 CONG. REc. H4623 (daily ed. July 12, 1990) (statement of Rep. Owens).
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A. Who Is 'Disabled"?
Technology and medical advances are turning the ADA into an
unworkable statute, and it was unwieldy to begin with. As we learn
about more afflictions, identify them earlier, even identify the likeli-
hood that they will occur in the future, it becomes more and more
clear that we are all disabled, some sooner, some later.24 Of course,
we have known all along that eventually everyone becomes disabled,
but now we can predict better when and how it will happen.
It has also always been true that many disabilities fall along a con-
tinuum. We are not either deaf, on the one hand, or blessed with
perfect hearing, on the other. There are many gradations of hearing
ability; further, we move along that-continuum as we grow older.25
This complexity complicates the task of properly fleshing out the
ADA's definition of "disability." At some point the task becomes im-
possible. Perhaps we are already at that point. And, indeed, many
disability advocates argue that this is why the law should worry less
about who can and cannot be labeled "disabled." But at least two
paths can be taken if the ADA's open-ended definition of disability is
not working.
One path is to rewrite the statute, so that it is no longer essential
to meet a definition of disability in order to be covered. In other
words, if you are discriminated against because of a mental or physical
condition of any type, that is enough to bring you into the Act's scope.
As Deborah Kaplan puts it: "If the individual has experienced dis-
crimination based on the individual's physical or mental characteris-
tics, then that individual should be able to take advantage of the ADA
to redress that discrimination."26 The too-broad use of the "being re-
garded as" clause of the ADA is, likewise, a means of ensuring that
even those who are not disabled can nonetheless sue under the ADA.
The issues will be limited to whether the discrimination was justified
because no reasonable accommodation was possible.27 What we will
24. See generally Laura Trupin & Dorothy P. Rice, Disability Statistics Center (visited Feb.
24, 2000) <http://dsc.ucsf.edu> (estimating that overall rate of disability increases from
6% of children and youth to 45% of adults aged 75 and older). "Disability is a normal part
of life, experienced by almost everyone, particularly when they get older." Id.
25. See Hearing Loss, 6 HARv. WOMEN'S HEALTH WATCH 4 (1999).
26. Kaplan, supra note 7, at 360.
27. See 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b) (2) (A) (ii) (1999):
[D]iscrimination includes...
(ii) a failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or proce-
dures, when such modifications are necessary to afford such goods, services, facili-
ties, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to individuals with disabilities,
unless the entity can demonstrate that making such modifications would funda-
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have, then, is a statute that makes it illegal for employers to refuse to
hire anyone unless they can document to federal bureaucrats and
judges why it will cost the company too much money to have this per-
son rather than someone else at the job. There are those for whom
this scenario does not send a chill up the spine,28 but I am not among
them.
The other path is to repeal the ADA-or, at least, to end its at-
tempt to cover every conceivable disability and instead limit it to a set
of narrowly defined, physical disabilities: blindness (carefully de-
fined), deafness (carefully defined), inability to walk, and maybe one
or two other afflictions. But it should be acknowledged that the per-
fect statute is the enemy of the good statute. That is, by attempting to
cover every conceivable meritorious disability, the drafters of the ADA
have written a statute that inevitably will include too many nonmerito-
rious ones.2 9
B. Asymptomatic versus Symptomatic Discrimination
Let us assume that there is no difference in principle between
requiring the employer to accommodate the genetic predisposition to
an illness and requiring the employer to accommodate someone who
already has the illness. That still may not mean that the statute should
be expanded; it may prove, instead, that the statute should be nar-
rowed. It may prove, by reductio ad absurdum, that the statute was mis-
conceived in the first place and ought to be repealed, and, barring
that, it may show that the statute should not be made worse than it
already is by enlarging it.
Gostin & Webber3 ° quote Justice Ginsburg in Bragdon v. Abbott
"No rational legislator . . . would require nondiscrimination once
symptoms become visible but permit discrimination when the disease,
though present, is not yet visible."31 Justice Ginsburg then adds, "I am
therefore satisfied that the statutory and regulatory definitions are
well met."3
mentally alter the nature of such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages,
or accommodations ....
28. See, e.g., Elizabeth Clark Morin, Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990: Social Integra-
tion Through Employment, 40 CATH. U. L. REV. 189 (1990) (arguing that the costs associated
with implementing the ADA requirements are "trivial" when compared to the benefits).
29. See Roger Clegg, The Costly Compassion of the ADA, PUB. INTEREST, Summer 1999, at
100, 111-12 (discussing possible reforms of the ADA).
30. Gostin & Webber, supra note 9, at 266.
31. Bragdon v. Abbott, 118 S. Ct. 2196, 2213-14 (1998) (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
32. Id. at 2214.
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That is quite a non sequitur: because a rational statute would say
X, therefore it says X That is not the way things work in the real
world, especially for a statute as broadly and vaguely written as the
ADA. It has many consequences to which Congress gave no consider-
ation, rational or otherwise. As Professor Rothstein notes, "The lim-
ited legislative history [of the ADA on the issue of genetic conditions]
has caused more than one commentator to question whether Con-
gress really thought much about the issue at all" 3 Besides, the ADA
is a statute protecting the disabled from discrimination, so if a person is
not disabled, a rational legislator would not include him within the
statute.
But would it otherwise make sense to have a law that prohibited
an employer from discriminating against an employee once some af-
fliction was manifest, but not when the affliction was latent? Intui-
tively, Justice Ginsburg is right that this seems backward. That is, if
the idea is to ban irrational discrimination, then it would make even
more sense to ban discrimination against those who are symptomless
rather than those with symptoms.
On the other hand, in some ways a ban on discrimination only
after symptoms have appeared could make sense. It will be easier-
since the facts will be much more concrete, much less abstract-to
discuss and litigate issues regarding the employee's actual abilities and
disabilities, reasonable accommodations, and direct threats when the
symptoms are actually present rather than years in advance of them.
Moreover, precisely because one would expect more discrimination
once the symptoms of the disease actually appear, it is more sensible
for the statute to apply at that time. As discussed later, the ADA is
really not best explained as a ban on irrational discrimination.34 It is,
instead, a ban on discrimination against people we feel sorry for and
think are being treated less nicely than we would like, and sympto-
matic people are more likely to fall into that category than symptom-
less people.
C. Other Arguments for Protecting "Genetic Disabilities"
Contrary to Deborah Kaplan's assertion, almost no one thinks
that people are disabled because they are immoral.35 But there are
many employers who believe that a person's mental and physical abili-
ties-and, conversely, disabilities-determine how good an employee
33. Rothstein, supra note 10, at 335.
34. See infra Section W.E.
35. See Kaplan, supra note 7, at 353 (discussing the moral model of disability wherein
many cultures associate disability with sin and shame).
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he or she will be. And they are right. That some people will do a
better job than others is not a "social construct," but a fact. Nor is
there anything wrong with trying to cure or lessen a disability through
medical treatment or rehabilitation.
Many employers may discriminate irrationally, but most will not.
If one employer refuses to hire you, there are others. Employers who
make poor hiring decisions will lose out. If they make enough bad
decisions, they will go bankrupt.36 When a disability is irrelevant to
how well a person can perform a job, it is unlikely that employers-
individually or, especially, in the aggregate-will want to deny that
person a job. In the current economy, in particular, good employees
are at a premium, and there is no reason to suppose that employers
will act irrationally by refusing to hire people who can make them
more profitable.
Likewise, it is just silly to write, as Gostin and Webber do, "Dis-
crimination based on an infectious condition is just as inequitable as
discrimination based on race, gender, or disability. In each case, peo-
ple are treated inequitably not because they lack inherent ability, but
solely due to a status over which they have no control." 7 Infectious
conditions can hamper someone's inherent ability to do ajob and his
or her desirability as an employee. Moreover, just because someone
has no control over a status-consider intelligence-does not make it
inequitable to discriminate on that basis. Conversely, we do have con-
trol over our religion and marital status, but I am sure that Gostin and
Webber do not believe that this excuses discrimination on those
grounds. In all events, it is ridiculous to ignore the moral, historical,
and constitutional distinctions between refusing to hire a school-
teacher because she has tuberculosis and refusing to hire her because
she is black.
Another policy argument is that if genetic discrimination is not
banned, people will be discouraged from having themselves tested,
with major public-health consequences.3 ' But the more of a public-
36. See generally RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOY-
MENT DISCRIMINATION LAws (1992) (discussing the antidiscrimination principle as it applies
to the employment relationship); GARv S. BECKER, THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION
(1957) (discussing the psychological and sociological causes of discrimination and then
analyzing the economic ramifications); see also Michael Kinsley, Baby Needs a New Set of
Genes: Everyone's Against Genetic Discrimination. Or So They Think, SLATE (April 19, 2000)
<http://www.Find.Slate.msn.com/code/Archive/Archive.asp>. Professor Epstein has also
written specifically on the issue of genetic discrimination. See Richard A. Epstein, The Legal
Regulation of Genetic Discrimination: Old Responses to New Technology, 74 B.U. L. REv. 1 (1994).
37. Gostin & Webber, supra note 9, at 270.
38. See, e.g., Matt Ridley, Hands Off My Genes, WALL ST. J., Feb. 15, 2000, at A26.
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health problem such non-testing might cause, the harder it is to be-
lieve that it will happen very often. When people are seriously sick
and treatable, most of them want to know about it.
D. "Substantially Limits.. . Major Life Activities"
In the wake of Bragdon v. Abbott, it is likely that, for those with
genetic predispositions, the asserted ADA "major life activity" that has
been "significantly limited" will be reproduction. 9 It is odd, however,
that this limitation will seldom be the reason for an employer's dis-
crimination.4" Also, this limitation is mitigated by the possibility of
adoption.
There also does not seem to be any way around the statute's re-
quirement of an individualized inquiry to determine whether "the ma-
jor life activities of such individual"4 are substantially limited by a
disability. This is only commonsensical. How can an eighty-year-old
woman claim that she is disabled because of a disease that impairs
reproduction in younger women? She is not disabled, even if the
younger woman is. This surely is also-contrary to Gostin and Web-
ber-a "morally relevant distinction."'42
IV. WHEN SHOULD DISCRIMINATION BE ILLEGAL?
The careful reader will by now have intuited that the author is
generally skeptical about the desirability of antidiscrimination laws.
The remainder of this Commentary discusses why this is so, not only
with respect to asymptomatic genetic conditions, but also with respect
to most other personal characteristics-except for race.
A. Too Much Law
American antidiscrimination law is a remarkable growth industry.
Depending on where you live and whether you are hiring someone,
serving him at your business, registering him to vote, admitting him to
a public or private school, or renting him an apartment,4" it is now
illegal to take into account a person's race, ethnicity, sex, religion,
age, disability, language, marital status, children, or sexual orienta-
39. See, e.g., Liu, supra note 8, at 397.
40. Cf Gostin & Webber, supra note 9, at 282-83.
41. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (1994) (emphasis added).
42. Gostin & Webber, supra note 9, at 270.
43. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a); § 2000e (hiring); § 12182(a); § 2000a et seq. (public ac-
commodations); § 1971 (voting); § 12182(a); § 1982 (1994) (renting); see also infra note 69
(school admissions).
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tion, to give just a few examples.44 And the list seems likely to keep
growing.
Many people-particularly whites-have to beware of another
Vietnam syndrome 45 when it comes to antidiscrimination law. Espe-
cially to the extent that they were apologists for state-enforced racial
segregation or just AWOL during the civil rights struggle, it is tempt-
ing to avoid opposition to ever-expanding guarantees of equality.
They do not want to be on the wrong side of history again.
But the new antidiscrimination struggles today are not the same.
They are not about race, and usually they are not about state-enforced
discrimination. Because they are not about race, the historical, consti-
tutional, and religious and moral dimensions are different; moreover,
nonracial factors may, unlike race, have some relevance to a person's
entitlement to equal treatment. Because state-enforced discrimina-
tion is generally not at issue, principles of freedom and equality-
which were on the same side during the struggle against official segre-
gation-compete against one another now. This is not automatically
to say that therefore these other kinds of discrimination ought not to
be outlawed, too, but it does mean that those who favor such prohibi-
tions cannot honestly claim that the issues are no different now than
they were at Selma.
Consider just a few recent developments. The California courts
have ruled that a landlord cannot, on religious grounds, legally refuse
to rent to an unmarried couple.46 Various courts also are in the pro-
cess of deciding whether the Boy Scouts can exclude girls,4 7 homosex-
uals,4" and atheists.49 Recently, a bill making it illegal for private
employers to discriminate against homosexuals came within one vote
44. See, e.g., WALTER K. OLSON, THE EXCUSE FACTORY: How EMPLOYMENT LAW Is PARA-
LYZING THE AMERICAN WORKPLACE 56 (1997); The Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-
352, 78 Stat. 244 (1964) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-2000h-6 (1994)); see also Edward
Felsenthal, Are Civil-Rights Laws Being Interpreted Too Broadly?, WALL ST. J.,June 10, 1996, at
BI.
45. After the Vietnam War, many American strategists were unwilling to consider for-
eign interventions, even when they would have made sense, because they were afraid of
becoming ensnared in "another Vietnam." See WILLIAM SAFiRE, SAFiRE's NEW POLrICAL
DICTIONARY 844 (1993).
46. See, e.g., Smith v. Fair Employment and Hous. Comm'n, 913 P.2d 909 (Cal. 1996),
cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 2531 (1997).
47. See, e.g., Yeaw v. Boy Scouts, 64 Cal. Rptr. 2d. 85 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997).
48. See, e.g., Dale v. Boy Scouts, 734 A.2d 1196 (N.J. 1997), cert. granted, 120 S. Ct. 865
(U.S. Jan. 14, 2000) (No. 99-699); see also, Larry P. Arnn, Scout's Honor; WKL. STANDARD,
Mar. 30, 1998, at 14; E.V. Kontorovich, Scout's Honor, NAT'L REv., Apr. 6, 1998, at 40; Scouts
Face Bias Charges in California, WASH. TIMES, Jan. 7, 1998, at A5.
49. See, e.g., Randall v. Orange County Council, Boy Scouts, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d. 453 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1998); see also Arnn, supra note 48, at 14; Kontorovich, supra note 48, at 41.
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of passing in the Senate; ° President Clinton called for its passage in a
recent State of the Union address. 1 Another bill recently introduced
by Representative Brian Bilbray (R-Cal.) would have made it illegal for
an employer to consider anything except "factors pertaining to job per-
formance."52 Representative Bilbray declared that, under his legisla-
tion, not only gays and lesbians but "other traditional victims of
prejudice" will now be protected from discrimination.53
While antidiscrimination laws are constantly being proposed and
discussed, there is really very little serious thought being given to the
most fundamental issue of civil rights policy, namely when the govern-
ment, as a general matter, ought to make it illegal to treat different
people differently. This Commentary concludes that racial discrimi-
nation presented an extraordinary dilemma and that in other circum-
stances there ought to be a very strong presumption in favor of the
government leaving the decision whether to discriminate to private
actors.
B. Who Is Equal?
There are two questions that underlie all antidiscrimination law:
Who is equal? Who decides? That is, which personal characteristics
should be ignored in a given context, and who should make the deci-
sion about whether they should be ignored?
"Discrimination" is treating people differently because of some
personal characteristic.54 We expect, even encourage, some kinds of
discrimination. We do not expect employers to hire simply on a first
come, first served basis; we expect interviews, a review of resumes, a
reference check. Most of us would not object if the employer decides
not to hire someone because the applicant's series of criminal convic-
tions for employee theft and embezzlement demonstrates his untrust-
worthiness, or because his past employers' accounts of his tendency
toward long, unexplained absences suggests that he will be unreliable
50. See John E. Yang, Senate Passes Bill Against Same-Sex Marriage; In First Test on Hill,
Measure to Prohibit Employment Discrimination Is Defeated, 50-49, WASH. PosT, Sept. 11, 1996, at
Al; see also S. 2056, 104th Cong. (1996) (a bill to prohibit employment discrimination on
the basis of sexual orientation).
51. See 'My Fellow Americans... State of Our Union Is Strong,' WASH. POST, Jan. 20, 1999, at
A12 (text of State of the Union address).
52. H.R. 963, 105th Cong. § 2 (1997).
53. In an Effort to Curb Discrimination, Bilbray Re-Introduces Workplace Fairness Act
(Mar. 6, 1997 press release from Rep. Bilbray's office).
54. See THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTrIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 376 (William
Morris, ed. 1973); WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 362 (1989).
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at his new position, or because his insults and assault of his interviewer
call into question his ability to work well with others.
So it is only certain characteristics that we think should not be
taken into account. But which ones? There are basically two answers
that have been given. The first is that some characteristics are irrele-
vant, and that taking them into account is therefore irrational. The
second justification is that some types of discrimination are immoral
because they are unfair. Frequently the proponents of antidiscrimina-
tion laws have used both justifications, or shifted back and forth be-
tween them, but they are analytically quite distinct.
C. Irrelevant and Irrational
Although the argument that certain characteristics are irrelevant
is frequently heard, it does not adequately explain the current system
of antidiscrimination laws we have. To begin with, there are many
irrelevant characteristics against which it is perfectly legal to discrimi-
nate. If I have a pathological aversion to the letter "k," I am free to
refuse to hire people whose name begins with that letter. And I am
perfectly free to refuse to hire people with a record of abusing ani-
mals, even though that characteristic is irrelevant to how well a person
can wait on tables.
Conversely, some characteristics clearly are relevant, but it is
quite illegal to take them into account. The Americans with Disabili-
ties Act provides the best examples. The cost of building a wheelchair
ramp into my restaurant is not "irrelevant," for instance, but it proba-
bly will not excuse me from building it.
There is also the question, "Irrelevant to what?" The law catego-
rizes our relationships with people: Joe is our employee, Jill is our
customer, Mary is our tenant, Fred is our friend. And certain charac-
teristics that each have will be relevant and others will be irrelevant to
their performance as employee, customer, tenant, and friend, respec-
tively. But sometimes our relationships with people are multifaceted.
And even when they are not, a given characteristic may be relevant in
some larger or different context. The fact that he is an adulterer may
be irrelevant to Joe's performance as an employee, but Joe's col-
leagues must deal with him as a fellow human being, too.
Fortunately, the government has not yet made illegal all discrimi-
nation against "irrelevant" characteristics. This would greatly increase
the acrimony in our already litigious workplaces (a fact which seems
not to have occurred to Representative Bilbray). The government has
not bothered to prohibit irrational discrimination unless it is wide-
spread and unpopular enough to merit attention. Pathological fear of
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the letter "k" is not widespread; discrimination against blacks was.
Some characteristics may be irrelevant to a position but discrimina-
tion against them is not widely objectionable. Who cares if puppy-kill-
ers get denied jobs?
A less charitable way to put it, however, is that the kinds of dis-
crimination that get prohibited depend to a large extent on political
muscle. There is probably less discrimination against homosexuals
now than there has ever been-according to the American Enterprise
Institute's Karlyn Bowman, eighty percent of Americans think that
homosexuals should not be discriminated against in employment mat-
ters55-and it is no more or less rational today than it has been in the
past, but the gay lobby is more powerful now than it used to be.56 And
so homosexuals are achieving legislative successes at the state and lo-
cal level, as well as pushing their congressional agenda.57
D. Disparate Impact
A special issue arises when the presence or absence of an irrele-
vant characteristic may be a good way of telling whether or not a rele-
vant one is present. Conversely, the use of a relevant characteristic
may result in the exclusion of a disproportionate number of people
who happen to have a particular irrelevant characteristic. What do we
do about this?
The law has given a clearer answer in the former situation than in
the latter. If you want to hire people with high school diplomas (the
relevant characteristic) you cannot use the fact that there is a higher
percentage of Hispanic than Anglo dropouts to justify a blanket policy
of refusing to hire people who are Hispanic (the irrelevant character-
55. See Erica Cook, Change Slight in Opinions on Sex, Drugs, WASH. TIMEs, June 24, 1997,
at A2; see also David W. Moore, Public Polarized on Gay Issue, GALLUP POLL MONTHLY, Apr.
1993, at 30; Gallup News Service Poll, question no.13 (Nov. 21-24, 1996) (noting that 84%
of respondents indicate homosexuals should have equal rights, an increase from 56% in
1977).
56. See Michael Weisskopf, Gay Lobby in Key Test of Strength; 'Seat at the Table' of Power at
Stake, WASH. POST, Jan. 27, 1993, at Al.
57. See David Elliot, Balance of Power in State Legislatures Slowly Shifting Toward GLBT
Equality, Annual 50-State Report Shows (visited Jan. 25, 2000) <http://www.ngltf.org.press/
121399.html> (National Gay and Lesbian Task Force Press Release); see generally DAN
HAwES, NATIONAL GAY & LESBIAN TASK FORCE, 1999 CAPITAL GAINS & LOSSES: A STATE By
STATE REVIEW OF GAY, LESBIAN, BISEXUAL, TRANSGENDER & HIV/AIDS-RELATED LEGISLATION
IN 1999 (1999); ROBERT W. BAILEY, NATIONAL GAY & LESBIAN TASK FORCE, OUT AND VOTING
II: THE GAY, LESBIAN AND BISEXUAL VOTE IN CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS, 1990-1998 (1999).
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istic). Employers have to consider each candidate individually, even if
it is cheaper, quicker, or more reliable not to do so. 8
One might think, therefore, that choosing people on the basis of
a high school diploma would be perfectly permissible, even if it
turned out that doing so resulted in a disproportionate number of
Hispanic applicants being rejected. Well, yes and no. An employer'in
that situation might be allowed to continue this policy, but only if he
can prove that there was a "business necessity" of hiring only people
with high school diplomas59-even if there was no evidence and no
accusation that his requirement was motivated by anti-Hispanic bias.
This prohibition of so-called disparate impact discrimination was first
promulgated by the antidiscrimination enforcement bureaucracy,6"
then read into statute by the courts,61 and finally codified by Con-
gress. 62 It makes little sense, and it is a powerful engine for quotas,
but it is frequently the law.63
E. "Immoral and Unfair" Discrimination
Where private discrimination is not irrational-the characteristic
at issue is not "irrelevant"-then under what circumstances is it none-
theless objectionable? The response has been, "When it is immoral
and unfair" or-for the more secularly humanized-"When it results
in bad social policy." But this, of course, really just begs the questions:
What is immoral and unfair, and what is bad social policy?
The more one considers the issue, the more one concludes that
there are simply some people that are pitied more than others. "They
can't help it and we ought to be nice to them" summarizes this ap-
proach. We want to help old people and people in wheelchairs, so we
58. The core federal prohibition on employment discrimination with respect to na-
tional origin, among other criteria, is found at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1994).
59. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971). The Griggs decision is the
seminal Supreme Court rendering on the "disparate impact" doctrine in antidiscrimina-
tion law.
60. See, e.g., Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's Guidelines on Employee Selec-
tion Procedures, 29 C.F.R. § 1607 (1999). An earlier version was cited in Griggs, 401 U.S. at
433 n.9.
61. See supra note 59.
62. The Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991), codified
disparate impact causes of action in employment at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (1994).
63. The disparate impact approach has, unfortunately, spread from employment law to
many other arenas. The author has discussed and criticized this development in Roger
Clegg, The Bad Law of "Disparate Impact," PuB. INTEREST, Winter 2000, at 79.
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have made it illegal to discriminate on the basis of age and disability,64
even though these are clearly not irrelevant characteristics.
It is interesting to think about whom legislators may feel protec-
tive toward next. People who used to be on welfare? People who lack
a college degree, or perhaps people who graduated from this college
rather than that college? People who have had an abortion? People
who are promiscuous? People with certain political views? People
convicted of certain crimes-say, "victimless" crimes like drug posses-
sion or prostitution? How about discrimination based on hairstyle,
body piercing, and tattoos? None of these possibilities is beyond the
pale, particularly in our more liberal states, so neither is a ban on
discrimination against such people. It is interesting that much of this
"immoral" discrimination involves bias against behavior-such as
abortion, promiscuity, and crime-traditionally thought sinful.
Just as the "relevance" of a characteristic is really a matter of poli-
tics, so too is the decision about the kinds of discrimination that are
immoral. The latter get banned even when the characteristics at issue
are clearly not irrelevant, so long as enough legislators-perhaps not
coincidentally at the urging of powerful constituencies-have decided
that taking them into account is nonetheless "unfair." Maybe it is ra-
tional not to build that wheelchair ramp, but Congress wants it built
anyway because, it says, disabled people ought to be able to go to any
restaurant they like.
F. Who Decides?
Which leads us to the second big question: Who should decide
whether a characteristic is irrelevant or whether it is immoral and un-
fair to discriminate against those who have it?
The truth is that there are very few characteristics that can be
deemed completely irrelevant for all activities. Certainly their rele-
vance or irrelevance will likely vary from situation to situation. This is
one reason why the person who decides whether and how to weigh a
particular characteristic ought generally to be the person who is near-
est to the situation and who has the greatest stake in ensuring that all,
but only, relevant characteristics are weighed.
There are other reasons to decentralize this decisionmaking.
Sometimes the right to determine if a characteristic is relevant or not
and what morality dictates will implicate an important personal free-
dom. Suppose that two women do not want to have a lesbian house-
64. See Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. (1994);
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101-12213 (1994).
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mate and decline to rent an extra room to her. Isn't a decision by the
government that they cannot act on their preference a decision that
trenches in a serious way on their privacy interests? Yet this coercion
is the law in Wisconsin, according to a court in that state.65 We saw
earlier that, in California, a landlord may not refuse, on religious
grounds, to rent to an unmarried couple.66 And isn't it important to
stigmatize sinful behavior even-especially-if it is not made illegal?
We may still love the sinner, but it does him no good to make sin
costless.
The Constitution itself would, if followed, help illuminate a path
for the federal government to follow in deciding when to make dis-
crimination illegal. The Fourteenth Amendment gives Congress au-
thority to ban discrimination by state and local governments, but not
private actors.6 7 Of the likely decisionmakers-the private actors in
the marketplace, the federal government, and state and local govern-
ments-the latter are most likely to engage in discrimination that
ought to be banned.
Thus, it makes sense for the federal government to have a role in
banning discrimination by state and local governments. In The Federal-
ist No. 10, James Madison foresaw the greater likelihood that smaller
political subdivisions would be captured by special interests ("fac-
tions," in those days), and history has borne him out.68 Many states
went in less than a generation from banning racial minorities from
public universities to mandating that they be given preferential treat-
ment.69 This is not enlightenment; it is more of the same. Politicians
65. See Wisconsin ex reL Sprague v. City of Madison, 555 N.W. 2d 409 (Wis. Ct. App.
1996). (At Tufts University, a gay student is pushing the school to allow coed dorm rooms,
on the grounds that same-sex rooms discriminate against homosexuals. Notebook, CHRON.
HIGHER EDUC., Mar. 24, 2000, at A53.)
66. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
67. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §§ 1, 5 ("No State shall make or enforce any law which
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . ").
68. See THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison).
69. See TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 51.601 (1999); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 240.2475 (West
1999); CAL. EDUC. CODE § 66205 (Deering 1999). The Center for Equal Opportunity
(CEO) has published a series of studies documenting the evidence of racial and ethnic
preferences favoring blacks and, to a lesser extent, Hispanics at a number of state universi-
ties in North Carolina and Virginia (and, in addition, California, Colorado, Michigan,
Washington, and Minnesota, as well as the military academies at West Point and Annapo-
lis). The studies are available from CEO and appear on its website. See CEO, Center for
Equal Opportunity (visited Apr. 15, 2000) <http://www.ceousa.org>. Florida and Georgia
apparently acknowledge that they use racial and ethnic preferences, although Florida may
soon end its practice. See David Firestone, University Stands Firm in Using Race in Admissions,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 1999, at A14 (noting that the president of the University of Georgia
promises to continue preferences); Kenneth J. Cooper, Fla. Minorities Plan: An Addition
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consistently cater to racial constituencies because it is effective politics
to do so. The national government has not been immune in this re-
gard, but as a historical matter it has done better than the states in
eschewing the ugliest racial politics.
On the other hand, we should be very nervous about granting a
role to the federal government in banning discrimination by private
actors. Such discrimination will take place either in the marketplace
or in noneconomic relationships. For the latter, individual privacy
and liberty interests will typically be at high tide and the federal gov-
ernment's interest and constitutional authority at ebb. When it has
acted to ban discrimination by private actors, Congress has typically
relied, rather dubiously, on the Commerce Clause,70 but even this
weak reed is unavailable when noneconomic relationships are at issue.
As to the actions by private actors in the marketplace, how likely
is it that the government will be a better judge than the actors of when
discrimination is rational? As Nobel economics laureate Gary
Becker" and, subsequently, others have noted, the marketplace will
discipline those who act irrationally: those who indulge a "taste" for
discrimination will be at a competitive disadvantage vis-a-vis more ra-
tional economic actors. Eyebrows should automatically be raised
whenever the government tells a businessman that it knows best how
to be more competitive. There is no marketplace to keep the govern-
ment honest, moreover, and "rent seeking" private actors know this.
G. Practicalities, Pro and Con
The most persuasive response to arguments like Becker's is that
they are too theoretical. As a practical matter, the counterargument
holds, antidiscrimination laws are needed because certain kinds of dis-
crimination are so deeply rooted in our psyches and mores that they
will otherwise never be discarded. The threat of social ostracism or
Challenge, WASH. PosT, Dec. 22, 1999, at A3 (explaining that the Florida governor has pro-
posed ending preferences there). Texas's use of such preferences has been successfully
challenged in court. See Hopwood v. Texas, 84 F.3d 720 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 518
U.S. 1033 (1996). In two instances, state preference policies have been overturned by state
ballot initiatives-Proposition 209, passed by California in 1996, and Initiative 200, passed
by Washington in 1998. See Tom Brune &Joe Heim, Initiative 200-New Battle Begins, SEAT-
TLE TIMES, Nov. 4, 1998, at B1 (discussing Washington's Initiative 200, which was approved
by 58% of the voters); Bill Stall & Dan Morain, Prop. 209 Wins, Bars Affirmative Action Initia-
tives, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 6, 1996, at Al (discussing voter approval of Proposition 209, which
eliminates government preferences based on race, ethnicity, and sex).
70. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8; see also 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(4) (1994) (invoking "the
power to enforce the fourteenth amendment and to regulate commerce" as authority for
enacting the ADA).
71. See BECKER, supra note 36.
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the preferences of third parties-like unions, customers, and other
employees-may pressure employers not to hire blacks; or it may be
wrongly assumed that women are incapable of doing certain kinds of
work; or there may be a "gentlemen's agreement" not to hire Jews.
Or, as is sometimes argued, it may be understandable that individual
employers will not want to incur the costs of hiring the disabled or
elderly, but collectively the results are inefficient and unfair. More-
over, while some generalizations happen to be true-it would seem
futile, for instance, to deny that women are more likely than men to
interrupt their careers for child bearing and rearing, or that older
workers are closer to retirement than younger ones-why not force
people to make decisions on an individual basis, rather than allowing
them to rely on stereotypes?
But those counseling skepticism about antidiscrimination laws
also can marshal strong practical arguments. No one denies that irra-
tional and immoral discrimination sometimes occurs-or that, when
it does, it entails social costs. Nonetheless, the fact remains that em-
ployers are generally unlikely to act irrationally, especially in the ag-
gregate. Public laws, on the other hand, sweep very broadly, and
cannot make case-by-case determinations. The law is a blunt instru-
ment. We are not all stuck with one bad employer. We are all stuck
with a bad law.
Even at a general level, the practical truth is that the government
is unlikely to know better than employers who the most productive
employees will be. And it will be the rare case indeed that the federal
government should be confident enough of what is and is not "im-
moral" that it should presume to preempt the judgment of private
actors. The practical workings of the private sector are not perfect-
but neither are those of the government. Politics will determine what
the legislature decides is "irrational" or "immoral." That is the way the
system is designed.
Even if a class of irrationally or immorally discriminated-against
employees is identified, a law protecting them will not necessarily
make matters better. It will not end all discrimination, and it will inev-
itably result in some number of spurious regulations, enforcement ac-
tions, and lawsuits. The public and private costs of such enforcement
will be substantial. Even in the case of race, there has been an enor-
mous difference between the colorblind ideal that was enacted and
the actual rules that today are being enforced.
As for macroeconomic effects, if it becomes very difficult to fire
anyone, and if creating a new position is problematic because the pro-
cess of hiring is so risky, the result will be a very rigid, inflexible
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workforce-thus defeating the goal of fluid and open employment
opportunities. The employer's as well as the employee's sense of effi-
cacy has to be considered, for both their sakes. The data are showing
that the ADA has not increased the number of disabled people who
get hired-perhaps because employers are afraid they'll be sued by
disabled employees.7 2 As U.S. Civil Rights Commissioner Russell
Redenbaugh-himself blind-recently wrote: "[M]y own fear is that
the ADA implementing regulations can have a chilling effect on the
hiring of the disabled."7"
Under the ADA, moreover, employers are asked to hire or pro-
mote people even when those people are clearly not the best qualified
for the job. Granted, such a law may encourage many disabled people
to join the workforce, but at a cost to employers and the nondisabled
people who are passed over. If the ADA's proponents nonetheless be-
lieve that the social gains are worth it, it is troubling that these general
gains are paid for out of the pockets of specific individuals and com-
panies, rather than through a broader levy. (At a minimum, for in-
stance, any costs attributable to ADA compliance ought to be
compensated with a full tax credit.) 4
H. Good Instincts, Bad Law
The cascade of antidiscrimination laws that have been passed
since the 1960s was precipitated by laws aimed at racial discrimina-
tion-discrimination that was both irrational and immoral and often
government-supported to boot. The passage of subsequent laws in-
volving other personal characteristics has stemmed from their propo-
nents' willingness to claim, however implausibly, that other kinds of
discrimination are no different from race. But there are two other
reasons why Americans remain sympathetic to antidiscrimination laws.
72. See, e.g., Thomas DeLeire, The Unintended Consequences of the American with Disabilities
Act, REGULATION, vol. 23, no. 1, 2000, at 21; Walter Olson, Standard Accommodations, REA-
SON, Feb. 1999, at 58, 60; Barbara Vobejda, Survey Finds No Job Gains for Disabled, WASH.
POST, July 23, 1998, at A20; Editorial, Good Intentions, Bad Results, INVESTOR'S Bus. DAILY,
Oct. 28, 1998, at A7; U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, HELPING EMPLOYERS COMPLY WITH THE
ADA 274-82 (1998) (statement of Commissioner Russell E. Redenbaugh).
73. U.S. COMM'N ON CIVL RIGHTS, supra note 72, at 280 (statement of Commissioner
Russell E. Redenbaugh); see also Editorial, Americans with Minor Disabilities Act, WASH. TIMES,
Feb. 20, 1999, at C2.
74. Currently only a limited tax credit is available, and only for small businesses. See 26
I.R.C. § 44 (1994); see also Civil Rights Division, U. S. Dep't of Justice, Tax Incentives Packet
on the Americans with Disabilities Act (visited May 5, 1999) <http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/ada/
taxpack.htm>; JEFPREY G. ALLEN, COMPLYING wrH THE ADA: A SMALL BUSINESS GUIDE TO
HIRING AND EMPLOYING THE DISABLED 102-05 (1993).
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The trouble is that while each is rooted in a laudable instinct, both are
misguided in this context.
The first factor at work is the erroneous belief that antidis-
crimination laws increase freedom. The reasoning goes like this: "We
need to protect gays from discrimination, because people should be
free to choose a sexual lifestyle, and they should not be penalized for
exercising that choice." This is the same instinct, one supposes, that
helps support laws prohibiting discrimination based on marital status
or whether one has children. People ought to be able to order their
own personal lives free from outside interference.
When the government is doing the interfering and penalizing, it
is true that individual freedom is being limited (whether that limita-
tion is unjustified is another question). But there is no increase in
individual freedom if the government steps in and prohibits a private
citizen from freely deciding with whom he would like to engage in a
business, contractual, or other relationship. This intervention should
bother libertarians as well as traditional conservatives.75
A second underlying motivation for the antidiscrimination laws is
that some people feel sorry for others and want to help them. But
what happens is that A, B, and C feel so sorry for D that they vote to
force E to hire him, even though she would rather not. It would be
better if A, B, and Cjust gave D their own money or found a job for
him.76 Barring that, if spending money on D is so necessary as a mat-
ter of public policy, then why not recompense Ewhen she is forced to
do So? 7
7
The charitable instinct for equal treatment is not only laudable
but deeply ingrained in Western civilization (if that is still considered
to be a mark in its favor). All men are created equal. 7' Let he who is
without sin cast the first stone.79 We are ultimately neither Jew nor
Greek, male nor female, slave nor free." All men are brothers. 81
But remember the second fundamental question: Who decides?
It is one thing for each of us as individuals to decide that we will, on
our own, help the downtrodden; that we will ignore the differences
75. See Roger Clegg, The ENDA Big Government?, WKLY. STANDARD, Sept. 22, 1997, at 16.
76. Cf HENRY HAZLIT-r, ECONOMICS IN ONE LESSON 194-95 (1979).
77. See supra text accompanying note 74.
78. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
79. John 8:7.
80. Galatians 3:28; see also Romans 10:12; Colossians 3:11.
81. See FYODOR DOSTOYEVSKY, THE BROTHERS KARAMAZOV [part II, book VI, ch. 2] quoted
inJOHN BARTLETr, FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 1074 (1945); THOMAS CARLYLE, SARTOR RESARTUS
[book I, ch. 10], quoted in JOHN BARTLETr, FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 379 (1945); JORGE LUis
BORGES, The Other, in COLLECTED FICTIONS 414 (1998).
[VOL. 3:409
ASYMPTOMATIC GENETIC CONDITIONS
between people; that we will be charitable to the less fortunate. But it
is quite different-as a political matter, obviously, but as a moral mat-
ter as well-to force some people to help some other people because
we think it their duty to do so. Jesus did not ask Caesar to levy a
redistributive tax so that the rich would be forced to help the poor;
He said the rich should do so voluntarily.8 2
There is no doubt that deep moral questions can be raised when
different people are treated differently because of their personal char-
acteristics. But sometimes moral questions are raised as well when a
person's characteristics are ignored. And the existence of such ques-
tions does not mean that the government should intervene. More
likely, it means the opposite.
82. See Luke 18:18-27. For another discussion of morality and discrimination issues, see
generally Larry Alexander, What Makes Wrongful Discrimination Wrong? Biases, Preferences,
Stereotypes and Proxies, 141 U. PA. L. Rv. 149 (1992).
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